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Abstract
The vast macroeconomic literature trying to explain the widely observed equity home bias 
disregards internationally active fi rms. In a DSGE model that features the endogenous 
choice of fi rms to become internationally active through either exports or foreign direct 
investment (FDI), we fi nd that the optimal equity holdings of agents are biased towards 
domestic fi rms. Our fi nding indicates that international diversifi cation is not as bad as 
empirical measures of the equity home bias suggest.
Keywords: country portfolios, multinational fi rms, international diversifi cation, 
international trade, foreign direct investment.
JEL classifi cation: F12, F21, F23, F41, G11.
Resumen
La extensa literatura macroeconómica que pretende explicar el ampliamente 
observado equity home bias ignora a las empresas internacionalmente activas. En 
un modelo DSGE que presenta la elección endógena de las empresas de ser activas 
internacionalmente —ya sea a través de las exportaciones o por medio de la inversión 
extranjera directa (IED)—, encontramos que las tenencias de capital óptimas de los 
agentes están sesgadas hacia las empresas nacionales. Nuestro hallazgo indica que la 
diversifi cación internacional no es tan negativa como sugieren las medidas empíricas 
del equity home bias.
Palabras clave: carteras de los países, empresas multinacionales, diversifi cación 
internacional, comercio internacional, inversión extranjera directa.
Códigos JEL: F12, F21, F23, F41, G11.
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Table 1 documents the equity home bias, as well as measures of multinational firm activity
for selected advanced economies for the year 2016 based on information from the Coordi-
nated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and the World Development Indicators (WDI)
provided by the IMF and the World Bank, respectively. The equity home bias shown in the
second column of Table 1 ranges from 0.69 for Japan to 0.41 for Germany. These figures are
slightly smaller in magnitude compared to those reported in Coeurdacier and Rey (2013)
for Japan, Switzerland and the United States for 2008, indicating a further decrease in
equity home bias that the authors document for the years prior to 2008. However, despite
the decline the equity home bias remains sizable.
In order to link the observed equity home bias at the country-level to multinational ac-
tivity, we resort to the OECD’s Analytical Database on Individual Multinationals and
their Affiliates (ADIMA), which is a newly constructed database that aims at providing a
multinational parent-affiliate register as well as a series of economic indicators. ADIMA
1 Introduction
Equity Home Bias in Country i = 1− Share of Foreign Equities in Country i’s Equity Holdings
Share of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio
.
How does the degree of internationalization of a country’s firms influence the equity in-
vestment choices of its households, and how does it affect the widely observed equity home
bias? Focusing on an individual household, investing in an internationally active domestic
firm is more attractive than investing in a firm that is solely domestically active. The
reason is that the revenue stream of internationally active firms is less prone to country-
specific economic conditions and thus provides a higher diversification benefit. Note that
this argument only involves portfolio diversification through holding equities of different
types of domestic firms, neglecting the possibility of obtaining portfolio diversification by
holding equity of foreign firms. Most economic work on international portfolio choice and
its empirical patterns exclusively focuses on the latter portfolio diversification motive and
disregards indirect diversification through internationally active domestic firms. In this
paper, we give a more diverse picture of different internationalization strategies for firms
and show their implications for the optimal portfolio choice of households. We model
two internationalization strategies, namely exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Those strategies are fundamentally different in the sense that a firm serving foreign markets
through exporting only sustains all of its production facilities in its country of residence,
while a firm serving the foreign market through FDI sets up production plants in the foreign
countries it serves. An FDI firm thus becomes directly prone to the economic conditions
in the host countries, while an export firm is only indirectly affected by these conditions
through the foreign countries’ demand for its domestically produced products. We are
focussing on the consequences of these two different strategies for the equity home bias
puzzle. It is a well established empirical fact that individuals all over the world hold large
fractions of their wealth in assets of their own country. To show the empirical magnitude
of this phenomenon, we use a standard measure for equity home bias, see e.g. Coeurdacier
and Rey (2013), which we calculate for country i as
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currently covers 100 of the world’s largest multinational enterprises based on total revenues
in 2016. A prerequisite for being included in the database is a listing on a stock exchange.
See OECD (2018) for a description and methodological details.
In column three to five of Table 1 we show the average share of domestic sales of the
largest multinational enterprises residing in each country, the average number of host
countries with operating affiliates, and the underlying number of multinational enterprises,
1See the Appendix 7.1 for a list of these companies for each headquarter country.
2Note that host countries for some affiliates are unassigned in ADIMA (see the OECD (2018), for draw-
backs in harmonising reporting requirements and standards). Hence, the reported averages of host
countries should be seen as a lower bound.
3Though beyond the scope of our analysis, further diversification of regional shocks within a host country
could also be achieved through the presence of several affiliates. On average, Japanese multinationals
have 81.77 operating affiliates while German parent firms control 491.26 affiliates. The average number
of affiliates per host country ranges from 2.91 (Japan) to 7.19 (France). As with the number of host
countries, these numbers represent a lower bound.
respectively. Given our selection of countries, column 5 shows that we are covering 69 of the
100 largest firms covered in ADIMA.1 The average share of sales from operations abroad
amounts to 41 percent for multinationals headquartered in the United States and to 98
percent for multinationals headquartered in Switzerland. The average number of host
countries ranges from 23.17 for Japan to almost 90 for Swiss multinationals.2 This spread
of sales around the globe shows the geographical diversification of these large firms’ real
activity and casts doubt on a dominating impact of domestic shocks on country portfolios
featuring home bias.3
Parts of the literature on the home equity bias suggest that its observation constitutes
evidence that households do not diversify optimally (e.g. Baxter and Jermann (1997)),
others try to rationalize the observation through specific economic channels (e.g. Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001), Heathcote and Perri (2013)). In this paper, we allow for the possibility
Table 1 – Equity Home Bias and Multinational Activity
Country
Equity
Home Bias
Multinational Activity Number of
Underlying
MNEs
Average Share of
Domestic Sales
Average Number of
Host Countries
Japan 0.69 0.52 23.17 12
France 0.58 0.31 40.20 5
United States 0.58 0.59 33.21 39
Switzerland 0.48 0.02 89.33 3
Germany 0.41 0.26 59.70 10
Notes: This Table shows equity home bias and multinational activity for selected economies
in 2016. Equity home bias was calculated using information from the Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Survey (CPIS) and the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the
IMF and the World Bank, respectively. Information on multinational activity was taken from
the Analytical Database on Individual Multinationals and their Affiliates (ADIMA) provided
by the OECD.
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to obtain international diversification indirectly by investing in domestic multinational
firms. We can therefore provide an explanation for why it might be optimal for agents
to bias their equity holdings towards domestic firms, instead of diversifying their equity
holding internationally. Based on this, we argue that the empirical measure of home
bias is underestimating the true international diversification of households as it does not
take into account indirect diversification through internationally active firms. Empirically,
Cai and Warnock (2012) show the relevance of this channel for the US. They find that
indirect diversification accounts for approximately 25% of the US equity home bias. Our
contribution is that we investigate the effects of internationalization strategies on optimal
portfolio choice of households in a theoretical framework which enables us to shed light on
the mechanisms at work for different internationalization strategies. We assess the effects
of introducing the possibility for firms to either tap foreign markets by exporting their
products or by setting up foreign affiliates through foreign direct investment (FDI). We
find that, due to the higher production diversification possibilities in the model with FDI,
the average domestic firm is indeed less prone to country-specific shocks, giving a better
hedge against these shocks than in a model with international trade only. Thus, given a
standard calibration the home bias in optimal portfolio positions is higher if we allow for
FDI.
Our work builds upon two strands of the literature. First, the literature on the home
equity bias puzzle that started with Lucas (1982). Second, the literature on international
trade with heterogeneous firms building on Melitz (2003). Lucas (1982) investigates a two-
country endowment economy with a single consumption good in which both countries are
hit by independently and identically distributed dividend shocks. Perfect risk-sharing in
this economy is achieved if all agents hold a percentage of their wealth in the stock of a
given country which is equal to the relative size of its market capitalization.4 The fact that
empirical evidence suggests that agents hold a substantially higher share in domestic equity
constitutes the original equity home bias puzzle and can be interpreted as evidence for a lack
of international diversification. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to explain
or rationalize this empirical finding. The second substantial contribution to the literature
has been made by Baxter and Jermann (1997). Essentially, they add labor income to Lucas’
one-good model and find that in order to hedge against labor income risk it is optimal for
agents to short home equity and to take up large long positions in foreign equity. Thus in
their model the discrepancy between theoretically optimal and observed diversification is
even higher than in Lucas (1982), indicating that the international diversification puzzle
is even worse than previously thought. A third fundamental contribution is Heathcote
and Perri (2013) who investigate a two good production economy with labor and capital
income and find that a standard international macroeconomic model building on Backus
et al. (1992) can rationalize the equity home bias to a large extent. This is because in their
4In Lucas (1982) there are two symmetric countries, thus 50-50 portfolios are optimal.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, section 3 explains
the intuition behind the optimal portfolio solutions resulting from the model. Section 4
gives the numerical parameterization of the model and outlines the solution method used.
Section 5 presents the optimal numerical portfolio solutions obtained from the model, as
well as a range of robustness exercises with respect to crucial model parameters. Section
6 concludes.
framework domestic equity is a good hedge against labor income risk. An extensive review
of the home bias literature is given in Coeurdacier and Rey (2013).
The second relevant strand of literature on which this paper builds on is the workhorse
model of international trade with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003), and its extension
by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) who investigate macroeconomic fluctuations with heteroge-
neous firms. The main feature of these models is that they include endogenous selection
into international trade and can therefore replicate the observed differences in firm-specific
productivity between exporters and non-exporters. In these papers, firms have an individ-
ual and heterogeneous productivity which they draw from an exogenously given Pareto-
distribution. If firms are productive enough, they are able to afford the fixed costs to enter
foreign markets as well as the shipping costs to export their product to these markets.
Helpman et al. (2004) extend the Melitz (2003) model by the possibility for firms to serve
the foreign market by horizontal FDI. Foreign affiliates are costly to set up, operate with
the firm-specific productivity of their parent firm, but hire local production factors in the
host economy. In line with the empirical evidence only the most productive firms engage
in FDI. Contessi (2010) incorporates horizontal FDI in the model of Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) to investigate its implications for macroeconomic fluctuations. To investigate the
impact of FDI activity on international asset positions, we extend the Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) model by FDI, international bonds, as well as international equity holdings. The in-
troduction of horizontal foreign direct investment follows the style of Helpman et al. (2004)
and Contessi (2010). Hamano (2015) investigates the hedging of variety risk in a Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) type economy with international bond and equity markets. His paper
is our orientation point for the asset structure in our model. Recently, Ghironi and Wolfe
(2018) show that in a model without trade in goods and through production diversifica-
tion alone, domestic agents that have fully home biased portfolios can still obtain perfect
risk-sharing as profits of firms engaged in FDI behave identically to diversified portfolios.
We contribute to both strands of the literature. By introducing horizontal FDI in a model of
heterogeneous firms and international portfolio choice we are able to thoroughly investigate
the real link between different internationalization strategies of firms and the portfolio
decisions of households. This theoretical foundation allows us to evaluate how the measure
of the home equity bias should be adjusted to account for non-diversified versus diversified
investments.
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5With ϕ = ∞ marginal disutility of labor is constant at χ. With ϕ = 0 it becomes infinite and labor
supply becomes inelastic. Following Hamano (2015) in the calibration disutility will be increasing in
the labor supplied.
The representative households in Home maximizes its expected stream of utility from
consumption Ct and labor Lt,
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUt(Ct, Lt), (1)
where the utility function takes the CRRA form
Ut(Ct, Lt) =
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
L
1+ 1
ϕ
t
1 + 1
ϕ
(2)
with the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ(≤ 1). χ(> 0) represents the dis-utility of
supplying labor Lt(∈ [0, 1]) and ϕ(≥ 0) is the Frisch elasticity of supplying labor.5 βt is
the endogenous discount factor and evolves as follows
βt+1 = βtΥ(Ct) , with β0 = 1. (3)
The functional form of Υ(Ct) is
Υ(Ct) = β¯C
−ν
t (4)
where 0 ≤ ν < γ and 0 < β¯C−ν < 1. Including an endogenous discount factor with
Υ′(Ct) < 0 guarantees the stationarity of the model including net foreign asset dynamics
as pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). Ct is assumed to be a nested CES
aggregator of goods that are produced domestically by home firms CH,t, imported goods
2 The model
The model consists of two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). If not stated otherwise,
foreign variables are indicated by an asterisk. First, in section 2.1 we turn to the households’
optimization problems, in section 2.2 before we have a detailed look at the structure of the
firms’ sector.
2.1 Households
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6Note however that this is a pure interpretation choice motivating the calibration of α1 and α2 later on,
it does not have any effect on the model setup.
7In section 5.1 we provide a sensitivity analysis of the model results with respect to the parameters α1
and α2.
by affiliates of Foreign firms CI,t:
Ct = [α
1
ω
1 C
1− 1
ω
H,t + α
1
ω
2 C
1− 1
ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)
1
ωC
1− 1
ω
I,t ]
1
1− 1ω . (5)
In this definition, the α’s give different weights to the three distinct good categories, i.e.
home produced goods, imported goods and goods produced in the domestic economy by
affiliates of foreign firms. The nested CES structure is commonly used in international
macroeconomic models with portfolio choice, since it gives a natural notion of home bias
in consumption (see for instance Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) and vanWincoop andWarnock
(2010)). Because in these models there are only domestically produced and imported goods,
the weights represent the home bias in consumption directly. In the case of FDI, there are
three types of goods entering the aggregator representing a weight on domestically produced
goods α1, imported goods α2 and goods produced by affiliates of foreign multinationals at
Home (1 − α1 − α2). To interpret the weights in a similar way as in a two good model,
we assume that FDI goods are interpreted by agents as domestic goods. This implies that
households care more about where a good is produced than about the origin of the firm
producing the good. Thus, (1 − α2) is the measure of the home bias in consumption in
our model.6 7 The consumption goods, CH,t, CX,t and CI,t are themselves consumption
baskets of varieties within the classified categories of domestic, imported and FDI goods.
They are defined as
CH,t = VH,t
(∫
ζ∈Ω
cD,t(ζ)
1− 1
σ dζ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
CX,t = V
∗
X,t
(∫
ϑ∈Ω
cX,t(ϑ)
1− 1
σ dϑ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
CI,t = V
∗
I,t
(∫
ϕ∈Ω
cI,t(ϕ)
1− 1
σ dϕ
) 1
1− 1σ
,
where VH,t ≡ Nψ−
1
σ−1
D,t , V
∗
X,t ≡ N
∗ψ− 1
σ−1
X,t and V
∗
I,t ≡ N
∗ψ− 1
σ−1
I,t introduce a love of variety
following Benassy (1996). ND,t, N
∗
X,t and N
∗
I,t denote the number of domestic, imported
and FDI goods that are available in the Home economy.
2.1.1 Optimal consumption and price indices
From the nested CES demand structure, the optimal consumption of domestic, imported
and FDI baskets, as well as individual varieties, that are produced domestically by domestic
that are produced abroad by Foreign firms CX,t and goods that are domestically produced
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Note that the price indices fluctuate with changes in the extensive margin or number of
varieties. This is because they are defined on a welfare basis in the model. The impact of
extensive margins in price indices is greater, the higher the love for variety, ψ. Following
PI,t =
1
V ∗I,t
(∫
ϕ∈Ωt
p∗I,t(ϕ)
1−σdϕ
) 1
1−σ
.
firms, imported from foreign firms and produced domestically by affiliates of foreign firms
can be derived as
CI,t =
(
PI,t
Pt
)−ω
(1− α1 − α2)Ct
cI,t(ϕ) = V
∗σ−1
I,t
(
p∗I,t(ϕ)
PI,t
)−σ
CI,t.
p∗X,t(ϑ) denotes the price of exported goods from foreign and p
∗
I,t is the price domestic
affiliates of foreign firms charge in the domestic market, both are denominated in Home
currency. Price indices are given by
CH,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−ω
α1Ct,
CX,t =
(
PX,t
Pt
)−ω
α2Ct,
cD,t(ζ) = V
σ−1
H,t
(
pD,t(ζ)
PH,t
)−σ
CH,t,
cX,t(ϑ) = V
∗σ−1
X,t
(
p∗X,t(ϑ)
PX,t
)−σ
CX,t,
Pt =
[
α1P
1−ω
H,t + α2P
1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)P 1−ωI,t
] 1
1−ω ,
PH,t =
1
VH,t
(∫
ζ∈Ωt
pD,t(ζ)
1−σdζ
) 1
1−σ
,
PX,t =
1
V ∗X,t
(∫
ϑ∈Ωt
p∗X,t(ϑ)
1−σdϑ
) 1
1−σ
,
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8For an individual firm, z and Zt affect its productivity independently of each other. Thus, for instance
the production of a domestic firm with individual productivity z for the domestic market is yt = Ztzlt,
where lt is the labor of this firm.
support [zmin,∞). Once drawn, this idiosyncratic productivity remains constant over the
firm’s lifetime. There is a time-to-build lag, as firms only start producing one period
after their entry decision. As there are no fixed costs of production, all firms that enter
produce in any subsequent period until they are hit by an exit shock. This exit shock can
occur every period with a fixed probability of δ and is independent of the idiosyncratic
Hamano (2015) we define the welfare-based consumer price index, Pt, as numeraire for the
Home economy. Therefore, real prices are defined as
H,t ≡ PH,t
Pt
,
X,t ≡ PX,t
Pt
,
I,t ≡ PI,t
Pt
,
ρD,t(ζ) ≡ pD,t(ζ)
Pt
,
ρ∗X,t(ϑ) ≡
p∗X,t(ϑ)
Pt
, and
ρ∗I,t(ϕ) ≡
p∗I,t(ϕ)
Pt
.
Similar expressions hold for Foreign.
2.2 Firms
In the Home country, as well as in the Foreign country there is a continuum of firms.
Each firm produces a unique variety of the consumption good with labor being the only
production input. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their individual idiosyncratic
labor productivity level z. Furthermore, firms’ labor productivity is dependent on an
aggregate country-specific component Zt.
8
2.2.1 Entry into and exit from production
Every period there is a mass of new entrants NE,t. New entrants are ex-ante identical and
face an entry cost fE,t in terms of effective labor. In terms of domestic consumption these
costs are
wtfE,t
ZE,t
, where ZE,t denotes the aggregate labor productivity level in the entry
sector and wt is the real wage level. Firms finance these entry costs by issuing equity on
the international financial markets.
Upon entering, firms draw their idiosyncratic productivity z from a distribution G(z) with
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productivity parameter. The timing is such that the exit shock only hits at the very end of
a given period, i.e. after the new entrants have decided to enter. This has two implications.
First, a fraction δ of the new entrants will be forced to exit before they can actually start
producing. The Home economy’s law of motion for the number of producing firms in the
current period is thus given by
ND,t = (1− δ)(ND,t−1 +NE,t−1). (6)
Second, households that invested in these entrants will immediately lose the value of their
investment. Because households cannot foresee which individual firms are hit by the ex-
ogenous exit shock, it is optimal for them to hold the same amount of shares in every
potentially producing firm of a given country. Therefore, it is without loss of generality to
assume that all firms of a given country are owned by a mutual fund in which the individual
households can invest. On aggregate, firms will enter production as long as their expected
profits from entering are at least zero. Because the average expected profit of the ex-ante
identical firms is equal to their average share price v˜s, firms will enter until
v˜s =
wtfE,t
ZE,t
. (7)
For Foreign firms similar conditions hold.
2.2.2 Internationalization strategies
Firms can produce for the home market and engage in international activity, either through
exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). The two internationalization strategies differ
in their cost structures. Exporters produce their goods in their domestic plants, using
domestic resources. They face a fixed period-by-period entry cost to the foreign market
fX,t, generally interpreted as a cost to set up and maintain a distribution network for their
products. Furthermore, export firms face an iceberg type shipping cost τt ≥ 1. In contrast,
FDI firms set up production plants or affiliates in the foreign country and produce by using
foreign labor input. Setting up and maintaining the foreign plant involves a period-by-
period fixed cost fI,t which is assumed to be higher than the exporting fixed cost fX,t. The
reason is, that these firms incur the same costs of maintaining a distribution network in
addition to the costs of setting up their own plant. Therefore, on the one hand the fixed
costs of FDI are higher than those of exporting, but on the other hand producing abroad
saves FDI firms the variable shipping costs.
2.2.3 Production, pricing and profits
In order to evaluate whether or not it is useful for a firm with individual productivity z
to engage in exporting or FDI, the firm weighs the different types of costs against the
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9Generally a Home firm’s production is Ztzlt for a good produced at Home and Z
∗
t zl
∗
t for goods produced
by a potential affiliate.
the Home country’s consumption good:
ρD,t(z) =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz
(11)
ρX,t(z) =
τt
Qt
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz
if firm z exports (12)
ρI,t(z) =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z
if firm z has an affiliate in the foreign country. (13)
Here, Qt =
tP ∗t
Pt
is the real exchange rate converting prices denoted in Foreign consumption
good terms into prices in Home consumption good terms. The nominal exchange rate 
can be assumed to be unity without loss of generality.
Putting the revenue and cost sides together, we obtain the profits an individual firm with
productivity z can generate from producing for the domestic market, from producing for
exporting and through its foreign affiliates, respectively. They are:
dD,t =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρD,t(z)
1−ωα1Ct (14)
dX,t =
1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρX,t(z)
1−ωα∗2C
∗
t −
wtfX,t
Zt
if firm z exports (15)
dI,t = Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρI,t(z)
1−ω(1− α1 − α2)C∗t −
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
]
if firm z engages in FDI.
(16)
potential revenues these activities generate. To investigate the cost side, it is useful not
only to look at the production functions of the different plants9, but also at the number of
goods the firm is able to supply to the consumers at Home and Foreign for a given amount
of hired labor. The latter differs from the former because of potential shipping costs. For
each unit of domestic labor input, a Home firm can supply Ztz units of its unique variety
to the domestic agents and Ztz
τt
units to the foreign agent. Furthermore, a foreign affiliate
of a domestic firm can supply Z∗t z units of the Home firm’s variety to the foreign agents
for each unit of foreign labor input. The total supply functions of a Home firm for each
production type are given by
yD,t(z) = ZtzlD,t(z) (8)
yX,t(z) =
Ztz
τt
lX,t(z) if firm z exports (9)
yI,t(z) = Z
∗
t zl
∗
I,t(z) if firm z has an affiliate in the foreign country. (10)
On the revenue side, firms are monopolistically competitive and face an individual down-
ward sloping demand function with constant elasticity σ in every market they serve. This
induces the following profit maximizing real prices, where prices are denoted in terms of
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In the profit equation for FDI firms f ∗I,t is the FDI entry cost to the foreign market that the
domestic firm has to pay. Total profits of a firm can be decomposed into profits generated
by domestic sales, exports and FDI activities. Thus dt(z) = dD,t(z) + dX,t(z) + dI,t(z). All
profits are denominated in terms of Home consumption good. Similar equations apply to
the foreign producers.
2.2.4 Firm averages
The heterogeneous firms and the variety they produce are completely characterized by the
firm specific average productivity levels. Defining a specific distribution from which firms
draw their individual labor productivity, we can define three distinct average productivity
levels: The average productivity of all firms that produce in the Home economy z˜D, the
average productivity of Home exporters z˜X,t and the average productivity of Home FDI
firms z˜I,t. Generally, they are given by
z˜D,t ≡
[∫ ∞
zmin
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
, z˜X,t ≡
[
1
G(zI,t)−G(zX,t)
∫ zI,t
zX,t
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
,
z˜I,t ≡
[
1
1−G(zI,t)
∫ ∞
zI,t
zσ−1dG(z)
] 1
σ−1
.
The variables zX,t and zI,t denote the productivity cutoff levels such that a given firm with
productivity z ≥ zX,t finds it profitable to export and a given firm with z ≥ zI,t finds it
profitable to engage in FDI. Due to the assumed cost structure it holds that zI,t > zX,t,
such that there is a direct mapping from the drawn productivity to the production modes
a firm engages in. The least productive firms only find production for the domestic mar-
ket profitable, firms with intermediate productivity additionally serve the foreign market
through exports and the firms with the highest firm-specific productivity engage in FDI
instead of exporting. The cutoff levels vary depending on the economic situation in a given
country and play a crucial role in the dynamics of the model economy. These levels are
derived below using an assumption on the distribution of firm specific productivities.
Following Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we assume the firm specific pro-
ductivity to be drawn from a Pareto distribution, which they show matches the actual
distribution of firm-specific productivity well. The cumulative distribution function is
given by
G(z) = 1− (zmin
z
)k, (17)
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d˜I,t = Qt
(
 1−ω1−σ − 1
) w∗t
Z∗t
f ∗I,t.
Furthermore, the shares of exporters and FDI firms in the total number of domestic firms
can be expressed as:
NX,t
ND,t
=
z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t
(zmin)−k
(18)
NI,t
ND,t
=
(z˜I,t)
−k kθ−1
(zmin)−k
. (19)
Importantly, the distributional assumption allows us to calculate the cutoff levels of the
individual productivities, for which firms break even when they consider to export or
produce for the domestic economy only or when they consider to engage in FDI or to serve
foreign markets only through exporting. Thus, firms with individual productivity equal to
one of the cutoff levels are indifferent between exporting or not, or between setting up an
affiliate or exporting, respectively.
The productivity level of the marginal FDI firm is implicitly defined such that
zI,t : dI,t = 0 ⇔ Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρI,t(z)
1−ω(1− α1 − α2)C∗t
]
= Qt
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
(20)
This leads to a cutoff productivity of
zI,t =
1
σ − 1N
1−ψ(ω−1)
ω−1
I,t
(
w∗t σ
Z∗t
) ω
ω−1
(
f ∗I,t
(1− α1 − α2)C∗t
) 1
ω−1
.
Using this productivity cutoff level for FDI firms and keeping in mind that the definition
of the average productivity level of all FDI firms is z˜I,t = 
1
σ−1 zI,t we can determine the
average profits of all domestic FDI firms from their FDI activity
where z denotes a specific cutoff productivity level and k(> σ− 1) is a shaping parameter.
From the distributional assumption, the geometric productivity averages in terms of the
productivity cutoff levels can be derived as
z˜D,t = 
1
σ−1 zmin, z˜X,t = 
1
σ−1 [
zσ−1X,t z
k
I,t − zkX,tzσ−1I,t
zkI,t − zkX,t
]
1
σ−1
z˜I,t = 
1
σ−1 zI,t, with  =
k
k − (σ − 1) .
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The productivity level of the marginal export firm is such that
zX,t : dX,t = 0 ⇔ 1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρX,t(zX,t)
1−ωα∗2C
∗
t =
wtfX,t
Zt
(21)
zX,t =
(
σfX,t
α∗2C
∗
t
) 1
ω−1
(
wt
QtZt
) ω
ω−1
τt
σ
σ − 1N
1−ψ(ω−1)
ω−1
X,t .
The key to understanding the households’ investment decisions in our model economy is
the budget constraint of the Home and Foreign household. Its description gives us the
Substituting in both the cutoff level of exporters zX,t and the cutoff level for FDI firms zI,t
into the definition of the average productivity level of exporters yields
z˜X,t = 
1
σ−1
σ
ω
ω−1
(σ − 1)
(
1
C∗t
) 1
ω−1
N
(1−ψ(ω−1))
ω−1
X,t
(
wt
QtZt
) ω
ω−1
τt [KKt]
1
σ−1
where
KKt =
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω τ 1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
(1−α1−α2)
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ 1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω .
with TOLt =
(
wt
ZtQt
)−1 (
w∗t
Z∗t
)
being the terms of labor. This implies average profits of
exporting firms of
d˜X,t =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω τ 1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ 1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
ω−1
σ−1
α∗2 − fX,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
wt
Zt
.
(22)
For Foreign an analogous expression holds. This completes the description of the firms.
2.3 The asset market structure and the household’s budget
constraints
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In essence, it has the usual interpretation that the Home household’s consumption smooth-
ing is restricted by its decision to split its income of the current period between consumption
Ct and different means of savings to carry over consumption to future periods. wt are real
wages and Lt is the labor supply of the household. Thus, wtLt gives the income from sup-
plying labor. Qt is the welfare based real exchange rate. It is defined as the welfare-based
Foreign price index P ∗t converted to Home currency by the nominal exchange rate t and
divided the welfare-based Home price index Pt: Qt ≡ (tP ∗t )/Pt.  can be assumed to be
unity without loss of generality. Therefore, Qt is defined in terms of the Home consumption
good and a rise in Qt constitutes a depreciation of the real exchange rate from the perspec-
tive of a Home country investor. The Home household can invest in shares of the Home
or the Foreign mutual fund. The Home mutual fund owns all the shares of the domestic
new entrants NE,t, as well as all the Home firms that produce in the current period ND,t.
The Foreign mutual fund owns all the shares of the foreign new entrants N∗E,t as well as
all currently producing Foreign firms N∗D,t. sh,t+1(sf,t+1) denote the shares in the mutual
fund of Home (Foreign) firms the Home household buys in the current period. v˜st (v˜
s∗
t ) is
the real price of a Home (Foreign) mutual fund share denominated in Home (Foreign) con-
sumption goods. Furthermore, the Home household can invest in bonds issued by Home
and Foreign. bh,t+1 and bf,t+1 denote the amount of Home and Foreign bond bought by the
Home household, respectively. vbt and v
b∗
t are the real prices of bonds issued in Home and
Foreign. d˜t and d˜
∗
t are the average real dividends of Home (Foreign) firms and d
b
t and d
b∗
t
are the real dividends of bonds issued in Home and Foreign. For a bond indexed by the
welfare-based price index we have dbt = d
b∗
t = 1. For a bond indexed by the empirical CPI
real dividends are given by dbt =
Pˆt+1
Pt+1
and db∗t =
Pˆ ∗t+1
P ∗t+1
, where the empirical measure of CPI is
denoted by Pˆ (Pˆ ∗). The interpretation of the pricing is that Home (Foreign) CPI indexed
bonds give a nominal payoff of Pˆ (Pˆ ∗) units of Home (Foreign) currency next period. Since
the rest of the variables in the budget constraint are deflated using the welfare-based price
levels Pt(P
∗
t ), the nominal payoff of Pˆ (Pˆ
∗) has to be divided by Pt(P ∗t ) to denote it in
real terms. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) the relation between the welfare-based and the
empirical CPI measures is given by Pt = N
1
1−σ
t Pˆt, with Nt = ND,t +N
∗
X,t, as the empirical
measure usually does not account for the changes in the extensive margin, which influence
the welfare-based CPI.
= wtLt + sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,tQt(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ). (23)
opportunity to explain the asset market structure as well. The budget constraint of the
Home representative household in terms of the Home consumption basket is given by
Ct + sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1Qtv
b∗
t
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The representative Foreign household maximizes its utility with respect to a symmetric
χL
1
ϕ
t = C
−γ
t wt (28a)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrsh,t+1} (28b)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrsf,t+1} (28c)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrbh,t+1} (28d)
1 = Υ(Ct)Et{(Ct+1
Ct
)−γrbf,t+1} (28e)
Ct + sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1v
b∗
t
= wtLt + sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,t(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ). (28f)
real budget constraint denominated in Foreign consumption goods:
C∗t + s
∗
f,t+1v˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + s
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + b
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v
b
t + b
∗
f,t+1v
b∗
t
= w∗tL
∗
t + s
∗
f,tN
∗
D,t(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + s
∗
h,tND,tQ
−1
t (v˜
s
t + d˜t) + b
∗
h,tQ
−1
t (v
b
t + d
b
t) + b
∗
f,t(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ).
2.3.1 Households’ optimality conditions
Defining the returns on Home and Foreign equities as
rsh,t ≡ (1− δ)
v˜st + d˜t
v˜st−1
, rsf,t ≡ (1− δ)
v˜s∗t + d˜
∗
t
v˜s∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
, (24)
respectively, and the return on the domestic bond as
rbh,t ≡
vbt + d
b
t
vbt−1
, rbf,t ≡
vb∗t + d
b∗
t
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
, (25)
where the dividends paid by a regular bond are
dbt = 1, d
b∗
t = 1, for welfare-based bonds (26)
dbt =
Pˆt+1
Pt+1
, db∗t =
Pˆ ∗t+1
P ∗t+1
, for CPI indexed bonds (27)
the first-order conditions of the household become
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Using the same definitions of returns on home and foreign equities as above the first-order
conditions of the Foreign household are
χL
∗ 1
ϕ
t = C
∗−γ
t w
∗
t (29a)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rsh,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(29b)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rsf,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(29c)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rbh,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(29d)
1 = Υ(C∗t )Et
[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−γ
rbf,t+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(29e)
C∗t + s
∗
f,t+1v˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + s
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + b
∗
h,t+1Q
−1
t v
b
t + b
∗
f,t+1v
b∗
t
= w∗tL
∗
t + s
∗
f,tN
∗
D,t(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + s
∗
h,tND,tQ
−1
t (v˜
s
t + d˜t) + b
∗
h,tQ
−1
t (v
b
t + d
b
t) + b
∗
f,t(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t ).
(29f)
2.4 Market Clearing
In the model there are seven markets: Four asset markets, two labor markets and a good
market. By Walras’ law one of these market clearing conditions is implied by the other six
and thus can be disregarded in the final system of equilibrium conditions.
2.4.1 Asset Markets
Following Hamano (2015) we assume that the equity supply of each individual firm is
normalized to 1. Because households cannot foresee which individual firms are hit by the
exogenous exit shock, they hold the same amount of shares in every potentially producing
firm of a given country. Therefore, the home household’s holdings in each home firm sh,t+1
and the foreign household’s holdings in each home firm s∗h,t+1 have to sum to unity:
sh,t+1 + s
∗
h,t+1 = 1. (30)
Analogously, the home household’s holdings in each foreign firm sf,t+1 and the foreign
household’s holdings in each foreign firm s∗f,t+1 have to sum to unity:
sf,t+1 + s
∗
f,t+1 = 1. (31)
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Additionally, there are two international bond markets and those bonds are assumed to be
in zero net supply:
bh,t+1 + b
∗
h,t+1 = 0 (32)
and
bf,t+1 + b
∗
f,t+1 = 0. (33)
2.4.2 Labor market
There are three separate sources of labor demand for production in each country. Home
firms demand domestic labor lD,t for production to serve the domestic market and lX,t to
serve the foreign market through exports. Furthermore, foreign firms serving the Home
market through their affiliates demand lI,t units of domestic labor.
In addition to the use in production, firms hire labor in order to pay entry, export and FDI
costs. Entering firms hire
NE,tfE,t
ZE,t
units of effective labor in total, domestic export firms
NX,tfX,t
Zt
and affiliates of foreign firms
N∗I,tfI,t
Zt
.
Adding up all of these demand sources of the average firms and equating it to the labor
supply of the representative household, the overall Home labor market clearing condition
is
Lt =
(σ − 1)
wt
[
ND,td˜D,t +NX,td˜X,t +N
∗
I,tQtd˜
∗
I,t
]
+
NE,tfE,t
ZE,t
+
σ
Zt
[
NX,tfX,t +N
∗
I,tfI,t
]
. (34)
For Foreign the condition is
L∗t =
(σ − 1)
w∗t
[
N∗D,td˜
∗
D,t +N
∗
X,td˜
∗
X,t +NI,tQ
−1
t d˜I,t
]
+
N∗E,tf
∗
E,t
Z∗E,t
+
σ
Z∗t
[
N∗X,tf
∗
X,t +NI,tf
∗
I,t
]
.
(35)
2.4.3 Good Market
International good market clearing states that international consumption has to be equal
to international labor and capital income, denoted in the Home consumption basket.
Ct +QtC
∗
t = Yt +QtY
∗
t (36a)
where
Yt = wtLt +ND,td˜t −NE,tv˜st (36b)
Y ∗t = w
∗
tL
∗
t +N
∗
D,td˜
∗
t −N∗E,tv˜s∗t . (36c)
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2.6 Net foreign asset dynamics
We can combine the two budget constraints of the households to obtain an expression for
the net foreign asset dynamics of the Home economy:
sh,t+1v˜
s
t (ND,t +NE,t) + sf,t+1Qtv˜
s∗
t (N
∗
D,t +N
∗
E,t) + bh,t+1v
b
t + bf,t+1Qtv
b∗
t
= sh,tND,t(v˜
s
t + d˜t) + sf,tN
∗
D,tQt(v˜
s∗
t + d˜
∗
t ) + bh,t(v
b
t + d
b
t) + bf,tQt(v
b∗
t + d
b∗
t )
+
1
2
(
NE,tv˜
s
t +QtN
∗
E,tv˜
s∗
t
)−1
2
(
ND,td˜t −QtN∗D,td˜∗t
)
+
1
2
(wtLt −Qtw∗tL∗t )−
1
2
(Ct −QtC∗t ) .
(38)
This condition can be interpreted as an equation for the dynamics of the Home country’s
financial wealth.
2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions are given by four of the first-order conditions for the Home
household (28a - 28e), the equivalent equations for the Foreign household (29a - 29e), the
aggregate accounting constraint (38), the 16 optimality conditions of the firm and the 12
optimal pricing and dividend conditions, the 6 clearing conditions for the Home and Foreign
labor and asset markets in (2.4) and the definitions of equity returns (24), bond returns
(25), the two definitions of the dividends of bonds (26), the definition of the terms of labor,
the income (36b), as well as the stochastic processes (37). As mentioned above, the goods
market clearing condition (36) is left out due to Walras’ law. Theses are 58 equations, in
58 unknowns. The unknowns are Ct, C
∗
t ,Lt, L
∗
t sh,t, s
∗
h,t, sf,t, s
∗
f,t, bh,t, bf,t, b
∗
h,t, b
∗
f,t r
s
h,t, r
s
f,t,
rbh,t, r
b
f,t v˜
s
t , v˜
s∗
t , v
b
t , v
b∗
t , d
b
t , d
b∗
t Yt, Y
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , dt, d
∗
t , NE,t, N
∗
E,t, z˜X,t, z˜
∗
X,t, z˜I,t, z˜
∗
I,t, ND,t, N
∗
D,t,
NX,t, N
∗
X,t, NI,t, N
∗
I,t, Qt, TOLt ρ˜D,t, ρ˜
∗
D,t, ρ˜X,t, ρ˜
∗
X,t, ρ˜I,t, ρ˜
∗
I,t, d˜D,t, d˜
∗
D,t, d˜X,t, d˜
∗
X,t d˜I,t, d˜
∗
I,t,
and Zt, Z
∗
t , ZE,t, Z
∗
E,t.
With 4 shocks and 4 assets that Home and Foreign households can invest in, we have
complete markets in our model economy.
2.5 The stochastic processes of production
The stochastic aggregate productivities and the productivities specific to the entry sector
are assumed to be given by the following AR(1) processes:
log(Zt+1) = ρlog(Zt) + t+1 (37a)
log(Z∗t+1) = ρlog(Z
∗
t ) + 
∗
t+1 (37b)
log(ZE,t+1) = ρElog(ZE,t) + E,t+1 (37c)
log(Z∗E,t+1) = ρElog(Z
∗
E,t) + 
∗
E,t+1. (37d)
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3 Portfolio intuition
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) derive general results for portfolio solutions in a com-
plete markets economy like ours. We can use a linearized version of the real exchange rate
and a static version of the household’s budget constraint to obtain an intuition on how the
household uses bonds and equity to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations and labor
3.1 Welfare-based and CPI-indexed real exchange rate
In general, the risk components in the welfare based real exchange rate in a model with a
preference for variety of the Benassy (1996) type can be decomposed as
Qˆt = qˆt + ψRv,t (39)
where ψ is the ’love of variety’ parameter, qˆt is the linearized CPI based real exchange rate
and Rv,t is the risk component associated with the varieties.
The welfare-based real exchange rate in our model is
Qt =
tP
∗
t
Pt
=
t
[
α1N
∗−ψ(1−ω)
D,t p˜
∗(1−ω)
D,t + α2N
−ψ(1−ω)
X,t p˜
(1−ω)
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)N−ψ(1−ω)I,t p˜(1−ω)I,t
] 1
1−ω
[
α1N
−ψ(1−ω)
D,t p˜
(1−ω)
D,t + α2N
∗−ψ(1−ω)
X,t p˜
∗(1−ω)
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)N∗−ψ(1−ω)I,t p˜∗(1−ω)I,t
] 1
1−ω
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the nominal exchange rate t = 1 in the re-
mainder of the exposition, as it does not influence the results.
Log-linearizing around the steady-state yields
Qˆt = (1−2SXD) ˆTOLt−SXDzˆRX−(1−SDD−SXD)zˆRI +ψ(SDD−SXD)NˆRD−ψ(1−SDD−SXD)NˆRX
+ ψSXD
[
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t
]
+ ψ (1− SDD − SXD)
[
NˆRX,t − NˆRI,t
]
, (40)
where SDD = α1ρ¯
1−ω
H,t , SXD = α2ρ¯
1−ω
X,t , SNI = (1 − α1 − α2)ρ¯1−ωI,t = (1 − SDD − SXD). The
first three terms denote the effects of changes in the terms of labor, relative FDI cutoffs
and relative export cutoffs on Qˆt, respectively. The last four terms represent the effect of
changes in the relative numbers of domestic, export and FDI varieties on the welfare-based
real exchange rate.
The average terms of trade are related with the terms of labor as follows
TOTt =
tp˜X,t
p˜∗X,t
=
z˜∗X,t
z˜X,t
TOL−1t .
income risk.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2008
The formula for the real exchange rate shows how deviations from the welfare-based PPP
arise in a model with FDI. The first term (2SXD− 1) ˆTOT t reflects changes in the terms of
trade risk that constitute a consumption risk. When there is a home bias in consumption,
SXD >
1
2
, and the price of Foreign export goods in terms of the Home export goods
rises, i.e. the terms of trade increase, the real exchange rate depreciates from the point
of view of a Home investor. The second term −(1 − SXD)zˆRX,t reflects consumption risk
induced by fluctuations of the price of non-traded goods between Home and Foreign, due
to changes in the relative export cutoff levels between Home and Foreign. For example
an increase in zˆRX,t means higher non-traded good inflation in Home than in Foreign and
therefore an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The third term −(1− SDD − SXD)zˆRI
reflects consumption risk induced by fluctuations of the price of affiliate produced versus
traded goods between Home and Foreign. An increase in zˆRI means that relatively fewer
Home firms will engage in FDI compared to Foreign firms and some firms will therefore
switch their way of serving the foreign economy from FDI to exports. All other thing
equal, this leads to a fall in the optimal average price charged by affiliates of Home firms
in Foreign, which depresses the price level of Foreign relative to the price level in Home.
Thus a rise in zˆRI causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate from the perspective of
a Home investor. The fourth term ψ(SDD − SXD)NˆRD reflects variety risk with respect to
the relative number of domestically available varieties. An increase in NˆRD means that a
relatively higher number of domestically produced varieties is available at Home than in
Foreign, leading to a depreciation of the real exchange rate if ψ(SDD − SXD) > 0. This
takes place as households value an increase of the variety choices in their consumption
basket, thus the welfare in Home increases relative to the welfare in Foreign. At the
same time, a higher number of varieties causes higher competition among varieties leading
to a fall in the average domestic price level and thus a real depreciation of the welfare
consistent real exchange rate. The fifth term −ψ(1 − SDD − SXD)NˆRX represents variety
risk with respect to the relative number of imported varieties and the sign of the influence
on the real exchange rate is reversed in comparison to the domestic number of varieties.
If more imported varieties are available in Home relative to Foreign, i.e. if NˆRX > 0, this
pushes the Home price level up and thus appreciates the real exchange rate. The two last
terms express the variety risk that materialises through relative changes in the number of
domestic, imported and affiliate provided varieties. The sixth term ψSXD
[
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t
]
Linearized this gives
ˆTOT t = − ˆTOLt − zˆRX,t. (41)
Therefore, the linearized real exchange rate can be rewritten as
Qˆt = (2SXD−1) ˆTOT t−(1−SXD)zˆRX,t−(1−SDD−SXD)zˆRI +ψ(SDD−SXD)NˆRD−ψ(1−SDD−SXD)NˆRX
+ ψSXD
[
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t
]
− ψ (1− SDD − SXD)
[
NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t
]
, (42)
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qˆt = (2SXD − 1) ˆTOT t − (1− SXD)zˆRX,t − (1− SDD − SXD)zˆRI . (43)
3.2 Portfolios from static budget constraint and complete asset
markets
We derive the intuition behind the optimal portfolios from a static version of the house-
hold’s budget constraint. Expressing both the Home and Foreign budget constraints in
terms of the Home consumption good, subtracting the Home from the Foreign constraint
with SW ≡ wC , SD ≡ ND d˜C and SI ≡ NE v˜
s
C
being the labor income, dividends and investments
relative to consumption in the symmetric steady state, respectively. Bond holdings are
multiplied by their dividend db and normalized by steady state consumption b′ = bdb/C.
We use the following definitions wˆRt + lˆ
R
t ≡ wˆt + lˆt − (Qˆt + wˆ∗t + lˆ∗t ), NˆRD,t + ˆ˜dRt ≡ NˆD,t +
ˆ˜dt − (Nˆ∗D,t + Qˆt + ˆ˜d∗t ), NˆRE,t + ˆ˜vsRt ≡ NˆE,t + ˆ˜vst − (Nˆ∗E,t + Qˆt + ˆ˜vs∗t ) and dˆbRt ≡ dˆbt − (Qˆt +
dˆb∗t ). The terms denote relative nominal labor income, relative average equity dividends,
relative investment and relative bond dividends between Home and Foreign, respectively.
Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) find that for economies with complete asset markets,
the portfolio solution of Devereux and Sutherland (2010) coincides with finding portfolios
[ ]
captures the relative changes in the number of imported varieties with respect to the solely
domestically produced varieties. If NˆRX,t is decreasing, other things equal, a relatively higher
number of imported varieties is available in Home in comparison to Foreign, which leads to
falling average price of imported goods in Home and a real depreciation of the exchange rate
from a Home perspective. The seventh term −ψ (1− SDD − SXD)
[
NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t
]
captures a
similar effect for changes in the relative number of affiliate provided varieties in comparison
to imported varieties. If NˆRI,t increases, other thing equal this means that a relatively lower
number of affiliate produced varieties is available in Home compared to imported varieties,
leading to a rise in the Home price level and a appreciation of the real exchange rate.
As for instance in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Hamano (2015), the welfare-based price
indices in our model fully reflect changes in varieties and this affects optimal portfolios if
bonds are indexed by the welfare-based price indices. As Broda and Weinstein (2004) point
out, in reality the CPI’s do not adjust for changes in varieties. Therefore a more realistic
assumption is that agents base their decisions on empirical versions of CPI indices and the
real exchange rate. To extract the effect of changes in the number of varieties from bonds
and the real exchange rate, Hamano (2015) defines the price indices in a way such that
the empirical real exchange rate does not reflect these changes any more. For our model
it becomes
and log linearizing this equation yields
Pˆt+Cˆt−
(
Pˆ ∗t + Cˆ
∗
t
)
= SW
(
wˆRt + lˆ
R
t
)
+(2s−1)
[
SD
(
NˆRD,t +
ˆ˜dRt
)
− SI
(
NˆRE,t + ˆ˜v
sR
t
)]
+2b′dˆbRt ,
(44)
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that replicate the complete market allocation, i.e. portfolios ensuring that the perfect
risk-sharing condition
Pˆt + Cˆt −
(
Pˆ ∗t + Cˆ
∗
t
)
= −
(
1− 1
γ
)
Qˆt (45)
is satisfied for arbitrary realizations of the stochastic shocks driving the economy. It is
important to stress that in this setup the static budget constraint (44) is not equivalent to
the period-by-period budget constraint (23). The static budget constraint does not capture
the period-by-period dynamics and thus we cannot deduce that if (44) holds, (23) holds as
well. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) derive their results for a case where they are both
equivalent. Although this is not the case here, we still rely on the static budget constraint
as we find it useful to derive households’ hedging motives from it, keeping in mind that
there might be other factors influencing the solution to the dynamic model which we obtain
by numerical procedures. Since our model is relatively complex, obtaining the portfolio
intuition from the static budget constraint instead of deriving closed-form solutions of the
portfolios simplifies our solution procedure. We proceed by substituting in the perfect
risk-sharing condition under complete asset markets in the linearized budget constraint
above. This yields
−
(
1− 1
γ
)
Qˆt = SWRw,t + (2s− 1)Re,t + 2b′Rb,t, (46)
3.2.1 Portfolios
We postulate the following loadings of equities and bonds on the risk components in Qˆt:
ˆTOT t = φTOT,bRb,t + φTOT,eRe,t
zˆRX,t = φZX,bRb,t + φZX,eRe,t
zˆRI,t = φZI,bRb,t + φZI,eRe,t
NˆRD,t = φND,bRb,t + φND,eRe,t
NˆRX,t = φNX,bRb,t + φNX,eRe,t
NˆRD,t − NˆRX,t = φNDNX,bRb,t + φNDNX,eRe,t
NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t = φNXNI,bRb,t + φNXNI,eRe,t.
Similarly, the loadings of the assets on labor income risk are
Rw,t = φw,bRb,t + φw,eRe,t.
with Rw,t ≡
(
wˆRt + lˆ
R
t
)
, Re,t ≡
[
SD
(
NˆRD,t +
ˆ˜dRt
)
− SI
(
NˆRE,t + ˆ˜v
sR
t
)]
and Rb,t ≡ dˆbRt .
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− (1− SDD − SXD)φNX,b + SXDφNDNX,b − (1− SDD − SXD)φNINX,b)]. (53)
Substituting in this set of relations into (46), we can solve for the optimal portfolio positions
that replicate the complete market allocation. Thus, the portfolio allocations we find
imply that (46) holds for all possible realizations of the relative shocks
(
Zˆt, ZˆE,t
)
. As
in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011) agents use bonds to hedge all risks deriving from
the real exchange rate, while they use equity to hedge those risks orthogonal to the real
exchange rate.
Next we have to make some distinctions depending on the type of bonds that are traded
in the model economy. If bonds perfectly load on the welfare-based real exchange rate and
have returns Rb,t = −Qˆt with dividends dbt = d∗t = 1, from above we have
Qˆt = (2SDI−1)φTOT,e+SNIφNDI,e+(1−SDI)φNEX,e+ψ(SD−1)φIV,e+ψ(SI−1)φID,e. (47)
Therefore, if bonds perfectly hedge all variations in the number of firms and their offered
varieties, the optimal portfolios become those given in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2011)
b′ =
1
2
[(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b
]
. (49)
Home bias in equities arises only because the real exchange rate does not fully hedge
against labor income risk. If the partial correlation between relative labor income and
relative equity returns φw,e is negative it is optimal for home agents to hold a home biased
share portfolio. This is a standard result in the literature (e.g.Heathcote and Perri (2013)).
Note, that the structure of the model can influence the partial correlation φw,e, as well as
the steady state ratio SW = w/c and therefore, the home bias in a model with FDI can
differ from that in a model without FDI if there is a systematic way in which FDI activity
influences these two numbers.
If bonds only hedge the CPI-based real exchange rate risk, i.e. Rb,t = −qˆt, the optimal
portfolios become
s =
1
2
[1− Swφw,e] , (48)
s =
1
2
[1− Swφw,e − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((SDD − SXD)φND,e (50)
− (1− SDD − SXD)φNX,e + SXDφNDNX,e − (1− SDD − SXD)φNINX,e)], (51)
b′ =
1
2
[
(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((SDD − SXD)φND,b (52)
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where SED = αρ
1−ω
H and α is the home bias in production in Hamano’s model, which is
1− α2 in our model.
An intuition is that the firms on average become less prone to the country specific shock if
some of them engage in FDI. Therefore, the correlation decreases, contributing to a larger
4 Solution procedure and parametrization
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) show that in models in which heterogeneous firms are char-
acterized in the way we do it here, despite the very rich heterogeneity, macroeconomic
fluctuations only depend on the average characteristics of the average domestic producer,
the average exporter and the average FDI firm and the fluctuations in the cutoff levels.
Therefore the model with heterogeneous firms is observationally equivalent to an econ-
omy with a representative firm that has a domestic branch, an export branch and an FDI
branch and is adjusting the relative sizes of these branches depending on the shocks to the
economy. This feature is very convenient since aggregation becomes easy and we are able
to solve this heterogeneous agent model by perturbation methods.
Regular DSGE models are usually log-linearized around their non-stochastic steady-state
and solved using an appropriate solution method (e.g. the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients, etc.). In models that include a country portfolio choice involving the possibility for
the agents to invest in multiple assets, as in the model presented here, this approach be-
comes unfeasible. This is the case because up to a first-order approximation, the portfolio
is indeterminate. In the non-stochastic steady-state, there is no uncertainty and portfolios
with the same return do not pin down a unique portfolio choice. The same is true for a
first-order approximation in which certainty equivalence holds and assets have to have the
same expected payoff. The method developed by Devereux and Sutherland (2010, 2011)
allows pinning down the steady-state portfolio choice uniquely by approximating the port-
folio part of the model to the second order, while the rest of the model is approximated
to the first order. Furthermore, the first-order dynamics of the portfolio choice can be
pinned down using a third-order approximation of the portfolio part and a second-order
approximation of the rest of the model.
For comparison, the portfolios without FDI from Hamano (2015) are given by
s =
1
2
[
1− Swφw,e − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((2SED − 1)φND,e + (1− SED)φNDNX,e)
]
, (54)
b′ =
1
2
[(
1− 1
γ
)
− Swφw,b − ψ
(
1− 1
γ
)
((2SED − 1)φND,b + (1− SED)φNDNX,b)
]
(55)
home bias in equity holdings.
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The parametrization of the model follows largely from Hamano (2015) and Contessi (2010)
for the parts regarding foreign direct investment. The parameter governing relative risk
aversion γ is set to 2. We interpret a period as a year and therefore set the discount factor β
equal to 0.96. As is standard in this literature, the lower bound of the Pareto distribution
determining the individual firm productivities is set to 1 and the time endowment of
workers is also set to 1. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is ϕ = 2 and χ is calibrated
Γ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.75 0 0 0
0 0.75 0 0
0 0 0.79 0
0 0 0 0.79
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
such that in steady state the households’ labor supplies are equal to 1. Furthermore, we
assume k + 1 > σ to ensure that the scaling factor  = k/[k − (σ − 1)] is positive. The
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution k determines the dispersion of individual firm
productivities and is set to 3.4. The elasticity of substitution among varieties σ is set
to 3.8 and the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods ω is set to 2.
This induces firms to charge an average price mark-up of 35.7 percent above the average
marginal costs. In the presence of fixed entry costs to production this is not as high as it
might seem. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) calibrate the exit shock δ to match the ratio of
job destruction in the US, which is 10 percent. This gives them a value of δ = 0.1. This
parameter governs the ratio of entering to existing varieties NE,t/ND,t in our model. The
fixed entry cost to production is normalized to be fE,t = 1. The fixed costs of international
activity fX,t and fI,t are set relative to fE,t. Following Contessi (2010) the share of FDI
firms in the total number of firms is calibrated using the fixed entry cost to FDI activity
fI,t. As him, we set fI, to 28 percent of ΘfE,t = 0.0036, which is the fixed cost of entering
production of a new variety annualized. The fixed cost of exporting is set to about 10
percent of this annualized entry cost. Following Hamano (2015) we choose a preference
for variety parameter ψ = 0.18. For the preference weights of the different types of goods
available in Home we assume α1 = 0.7 and α2 = 0.15. This also leaves the weight on
goods produced by Foreign affiliates in Home 1 − α1 − α2 = 0.15. Therefore, we assume
equal preference weights on imported and affiliate provided goods. We moreover assume
symmetric preference weights for Foreign consumers.
Like Hamano (2015) we take the shock processes from Coeurdacier et al. (2010). For annual
data from 1984 to 2004, they estimate productivity processes for the G7 countries. The
AR(1) process for our 4 shocks in matrix notation is
Zt+1 = ΓZt + t+1 (56)
where Zt = [log(Zt) log(Z
∗
t ) log(ZE,t) log(Z
∗
E,t)] and t = [t 
∗
t E,t 
∗
E,t]. The matrix Γ
and the variance-covariance matrix Σ of the innovations t are assumed to be
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10These variances and covariances are the same in relative magnitude as in Hamano (2015), but smaller
in absolute magnitude to ensure sensible simulation results, i.e. that for instance consumption is not
negative after shocks. Since asset markets are complete, this does not affect the portfolio solutions.
The first two columns show the optimal equity and bond portfolios for our baseline model
with bonds indexed by the welfare-based CPI, while the third and fourth column show the
optimal portfolios in an economy with bonds indexed by the empirical CPI.
The very first column shows the optimal bond and equity portfolio holdings of the Home
household in a model in which firms can only tap international markets by exporting. This
setup, as well as the results shown are identical to Hamano (2015). The model produces
a significant home bias in domestic equity holdings for all specifications. In fact, home
households short foreign equity to take excessive long positions in domestic equity. With
welfare-based bonds available, Home households optimally hold 114 percent of the shares
of Home firms, while at the same time, they hold −14 percent of the shares of foreign firms,
i.e. they increase their exposure to domestic equity by short-selling foreign equity. At the
same time the Foreign household does the opposite trade and shorts home equity. Thus,
this is a sustainable equilibrium outcome. The bond position is positive such that in order
and
Σ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.0096 0.0043 0 0
0.0043 0.0096 0 0
0 0 0.0199 0.0038
0 0 0.0038 0.0199
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .10
5 Optimal portfolios with different internationalization
strategies
The results we obtain by applying the Devereux and Sutherland solution algorithm for our
baseline calibration are given in Table 2.
Table 2 – Optimal Portfolios
Welfare RER Empirical RER
Without FDI With FDI Without FDI With FDI
Equity 1.14 1.86 1.56 1.83
Bonds 0.70 0.19 0.68 0.13
to hedge the real exchange rate risk, Home households save in domestic bonds and borrow
abroad.
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11Intuitively, there is risk related with the number of foreign varieties that are available in future periods,
more varieties for instance imply higher consumption spending on these varieties in future periods.
Since foreign goods are denominated in foreign currency exposure to foreign bonds reduces consumption
spending risk in foreign currency and therefore hedges against fluctuations in the real exchange rate.
Qualitatively, the same is the case with bonds based on the empirical CPI in column 3
which shows that the optimal equity bias increases to 156 percent and bond positions
decrease as the variety risk component drops out of the empirical real exchange rate and
households have to hedge additional risk.11 Again this is identical to the model case shown
in Hamano (2015).
In our model with FDI, the optimal share Home households hold in the equity issued
by domestic firms amounts to 186 percent and is thus higher than in the comparable
benchmark model without FDI. This is in line with our expectations that FDI increases
a Home firms exposure to foreign country risk and therefore holdings of domestic equity
become more attractive to Home investors looking to diversify risk. Equity positions again
increase with CPI-indexed bonds compared to welfare-indexed bonds. The overall equity
position with FDI is a bit lower under empirically indexed bonds compared to welfare-
based bonds. The opposite holds true in Hamano (2015)’s model without FDI. Moreover,
as before the Home household is more exposed to foreign bonds when these are CPI-based
bonds.
Following Hamano (2015), we explore the possible sources of the high home bias we obtain.
For doing so we take a closer look at the conditional correlations that enter the optimal
portfolio choices that we derived from the static budget constraint. The results for standard
empirical CPI indexed bonds are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 – Conditional correlations - Baseline Model
φw,. φND,. φNX,. φNDNX,. φNINX,.
FDI
Equity -0.94 -0.38 0.99 0.92 0.98
Bonds 0.15 -0.16 -0.99 -0.96 -0.99
No FDI
Equity -0.87 -0.31 - -0.83 -
Bonds -0.35 -0.02 - 0.98 -
The entries in the above table give correlations of the relative wages, as well as the variety
effects given in the portfolio solutions (50) with the relative return of one asset, conditional
on the relative return of the other asset. The definition of the conditional returns is given
by
φx,y = ρxy|z =
ρxy − ρxzρzy√
1− ρ2xz
√
1− ρ2zy
. (57)
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12Since the coefficients on these terms are not directly comparable across models, we only compare them
qualitatively and not in terms of their magnitude.
solution algorithm.
Looking at the differences in bond portfolios, we see that the conditional correlation φw,b
is positive. This is the reason why agents hold less bonds in the economy with CPI based
bonds.
A shortfall of the model is the absolute magnitude of the portfolios we find and the fact
that in our model the Home household wants to short foreign equity to gain additional
exposure to domestic equity. This is at odds with observed data. However, given that
Hamano (2015) in a model without FDI also finds optimal Home equity shares above one
and our findings for the baseline case without FDI are very similar to those in Hamano
(2015), this does not come as a surprise. Our aim in this paper is to show that the presence
of FDI raises the optimal equity home bias in a DSGE model with endogenous selection
For our baseline model with FDI x represents one of the relative differences Rw,t, Nˆ
R
D,t,
NˆRX,t, Nˆ
R
D,t − NˆRX,t and NˆRI,t − NˆRX,t. y represents Re,t or Rb,t, while z represents the other
asset return, respectively. So for instance, φw,e represents the correlation between relative
labor income and relative equity returns, conditional on relative bond returns. For the
model without FDI, which is analogous to the model of Hamano (2015), x represents one
of the relative differences Rw,t, Nˆ
R
D,t, and Nˆ
R
D,t − NˆRX,t.
Our portfolio equations in a model with FDI differ from the ones obtained by Hamano
(2015) in a model without FDI in that they load on additional risk components and fur-
thermore the weights given to these components. Therefore, they are only comparable to
a limited degree. In the case where welfare-based bonds can be traded, the equity portfo-
lios in both models only depend on the conditional correlation between wages and equity
returns, given the returns on bonds, φw,e. As in Hamano (2015), the negative value of
−0.87 is the main source of the high equity home bias in the model without FDI. The first
column of table 3 shows that the presence of FDI further lowers this correlation to −0.94
contributing to higher optimal Home equity holdings. For the case of CPI-based bonds,
two sources of risk that equity positions aim to hedge against, the number of domestic
firms and the relative number of domestic exporters and FDI firms contribute to a higher
equity home bias. This can be seen by the positive partial correlation coefficients φNX,e
and φNINX,e. The partial correlation coefficient on the relative number of domestic firms
and domestic exports φNDNX,e is also positive, but enters in the portfolio solution with a
negative sign. Therefore this margin contributes to a lower home bias.12
From the above portfolio intuition we thus expect that the home equity positions in our
dynamic model are higher in a model of FDI compared to a model where FDI is not present
and also higher in a model where CPI-based bonds are traded compared to one in which
bonds are welfare based. This is consistent with the portfolio solution we obtain with our
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into internationalization modes of production, as is suggested in the empirical work by
(Cai and Warnock, 2012). To make the theoretical model match the empirical data to a
realistic extend the modeling framework has to be refined. Nonetheless, the direction in
which portfolios move in our model in the presence of FDI is a valuable theoretical and
qualitative contribution.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 1 shows the sensitivity analysis of the portfolio solution we conduct with respect
to different parameter choices. In particular, we vary the parameters of the CES demand
aggregator, α1 and α2, as well as the elasticities of substitution among varieties, σ and
between Home and Foreign goods ω. As a reminder, their standard calibration used for
the results presented above is α1 = 0.7, α2 = 0.15, σ = 3.8 and ω = 2. In figure 1 this
standard calibration is represented by the dots. The x-axis in the graphs contained in the
figure represent the variation in the respective parameters, while the y-axis represents the
respective optimal domestic equity holdings if we vary the respective parameter, keeping
all other parameters at their baseline calibration.
Figure 1 – Sensitivity Analysis
The upper left panel corresponding to the weight of domestically produced goods α1 in the
demand aggregator shows that the optimal domestic equity share falls with the consump-
tion bias for purely domestically produced goods, this reflects the fact that international-
ization of a firm together with a higher preference for the goods it provides through both
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exporting and FDI activity (represented by a fall in α1) makes it less prone to domestic
shocks alone and increases its diversification benefits for domestic investors. At the same
time, as shown in the upper right panel, a rise in the weight of imported goods α2 also leads
to a falling optimal domestic equity position, reflecting that a further increase in FDI pref-
erence and activity (represented by a fall in α2) lead to even higher diversification gains,
just as our theory predicts. The lower two panels show the robustness check with respect
to the two elasticities of substitution. The left panel shows that the higher the elasticity of
substitution between varieties, the lower the optimal home equity position as it becomes
more optimal to diversify internationally as individual variety profits become more elastic.
The right panel shows that if Home and Foreign goods are complements (ω > 1), the
higher the elastcity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods, the higher the opti-
mal Home equity position as Home and Foreign production shocks induce less variability in
consumption and welfare. If Home and Foreign goods are substitutes (ω < 1) the opposite
holds true. Concerning the level of Home bias evident across these portfolio positions it
remains strongly biased towards Home equity in comparison to Foreign equity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate two questions: How does the degree of internationalization
of a country’s firms influence the equity investment choices of its households, and how
does it affect the widely observed equity home bias? Our rational is that in addition
to being prone to the economic conditions of their home country, internationally active
firms also depend on the economic conditions of other countries they operate in. Thus
the shares of multinational firms provide a higher diversification benefit to investors than
investing in a firm that is operating solely nationally. In a DSGE model that includes
the endogenous choice of firms to become internationally active through either exports or
foreign direct investment (FDI), we find that indeed the optimal equity holdings of agents
are more strongly biased towards domestic firms than in a model with trade only. Our
finding indicates that international diversification is not as bad as empirical measures of
the equity home bias suggest and that the international activity of firms should be taken
into account when calculating empirical measures of the equity home bias.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2008
Cai, Fang and Francis E. Warnock (2012), “Foreign exposure through domestic equities.”
Finance Research Letters, 9, 8–20.
Heathcote, Jonathan and Fabrizio Perri (2013), “The International Diversification Puzzle
Is Not as Bad as You Think.” Journal of Political Economy, 121, 1108 – 1159.
References
Backus, David K, Patrick J Kehoe, and Finn E Kydland (1992), “International Real Busi-
ness Cycles.” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 745–75.
Baxter, Marianne and Urban J Jermann (1997), “The International Diversification Puzzle
Is Worse Than You Think.” American Economic Review, 87, 170–80.
Benassy, Jean-Pascal (1996), “Taste for variety and optimum production patterns in mo-
nopolistic competition.” Economics Letters, 52, 41–47.
Broda, Christian and David W. Weinstein (2004), “Variety Growth and World Welfare.”
American Economic Review, 94, 139–144.
Coeurdacier, Nicolas and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas (2011), “When Bonds Matter: Home
Bias in Goods and Assets.”
Coeurdacier, Nicolas, Robert Kollmann, and Philippe Martin (2010), “International port-
folios, capital accumulation and foreign assets dynamics.” Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 80, 100–112.
Coeurdacier, Nicolas and He´le`ne Rey (2013), “Home Bias in Open Economy Financial
Macroeconomics.” Journal of Economic Literature, 51, 63–115.
Contessi, Silvio (2010), “How Does Multinational Production Change International Co-
movement?” Mimeo.
Devereux, Michael B. and Alan Sutherland (2010), “Country portfolio dynamics.” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34, 1325–1342.
Devereux, Michael B. and Alan Sutherland (2011), “Country Portfolios In Open Economy
Macro-Models.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9, 337–369.
Ghironi, Fabio and Marc J. Melitz (2005), “International Trade and Macroeconomic Dy-
namics with Heterogeneous Firms.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 865–915.
Ghironi, Fabio and Marketa Halova Wolfe (2018), “Multinational Production, Risk Shar-
ing,and Home Equity Bias.” Mimeo.
Hamano, Masashige (2015), “International equity and bond positions in a dsge model with
variety risk in consumption.” Journal of International Economics, 96, 212 – 226.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2008
OECD (2018), “Measuring MNEs using Big Data: The OECD Analytical Database on
Individual Multinationals and their Affiliates.” Technical report, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development.
Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Martin Uribe (2003), “Closing small open economy models.”
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, 61, 163–185.
van Wincoop, Eric and Francis E. Warnock (2010), “Can trade costs in goods explain home
bias in assets?” Journal of International Money and Finance, 29, 1108–1123.
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple (2004), “Export Versus FDI
with Heterogeneous Firms.” American Economic Review, 94, 300–316.
Lucas, Robert Jr. (1982), “Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country world.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 10, 335–359.
Melitz, Marc J. (2003), “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggre-
gate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (2001), “The Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?”
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2008
7 Appendix
7.1 Multinational enterprises from the OECD’s ADIMA
Multinational enterprises from the OECD’s ADIMA underlying Table 1
France: Carrefour SA, Engie SA, Peugeot SA, Renault SA, Total SA;
Germany : BASF SE, Bayer AG, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, Ceconomy AG, Daimler
AG, Deutsche Post AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, Siemens AG, Uniper SE, Volkswagen AG;
Japan: Aeon Co Ltd, Hitachi Ltd, Honda Motor Co Ltd, JXTG Holdings Inc, Marubeni
Corp, Mitsubishi Corp, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp, Nissan Motor Co Ltd,
Panasonic Corp, SoftBank Group Corp, Sony Corp, Toyota Motor Corp;
Switzerland : Nestle SA, Novartis AG, Roche Holding AG;
United States : AT&T Inc, Aetna Inc, Alphabet Inc, Amazon.com Inc, Apple Inc, Archer
Daniels Midland Co, Boeing Co, CVS Health Corp, Cardinal Health Inc, Comcast Corp,
Costco Wholesale Corp, Dell Technologies Inc, DowDuPont Inc, Express Scripts Holding
Co, Exxon Mobil Corp, FedEx Corp, Ford Motor Co, General Electric Co, General Motors
Co, HP Inc, Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co, Home Depot Inc, Intel Corp, International
Business Machines Corp, Johnson & Johnson, McKesson Corp, Microsoft Corp, PepsiCo
Inc, Pfizer Inc, Phillips 66, Procter & Gamble Co, Sysco Corp, United Parcel Service Inc,
United Technologies Corp, UnitedHealth Group Inc, Valero Energy Corp, Wal-Mart Stores
Inc, Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc, Walt Disney Co.
7.2 The equation system
• Price indices:
[
α1ρ
1−ω
H,t + α2ρ
1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)ρ1−ωFDI,t
]
= 1 (58)[
α1ρ
∗1−ω
H,t + α2ρ
∗1−ω
X,t + (1− α1 − α2)ρ∗1−ωFDI,t
]
= 1 (59)
• Price indices - Domestic Components:
ρH,t = N
−ψ
D,t ρ˜D,t (60)
ρ∗H,t = N
∗−ψ
D,t ρ˜
∗
D,t (61)
• Price indices - Imported Components:
ρX,t = N
∗−ψ
X,t ρ˜
∗
X,t (62)
ρ∗X,t = N
−ψ
D,t ρ˜X,t (63)
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• Firm level pricing - FDI goods sold by foreign affiliates:
ρ˜I,t =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜I,t
(70)
ρ˜∗I,t =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜∗I,t
(71)
• Total average profits:
d˜t = d˜D,t +
NX,t
ND,t
d˜X,t +
NI,t
ND,t
d˜I,t (72)
d˜∗t = d˜
∗
D,t +
N∗X,t
N∗D,t
d˜∗X,t +
N∗I,t
N∗D,t
d˜∗I,t (73)
• Average profits from domestically sold goods:
d˜D,t =
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρ˜
1−ω
D,t α1Ct (74)
d˜∗D,t =
1
σ
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
D,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
D,t α1C
∗
t (75)
• Average profits from exported goods:
d˜X,t =
1
σ
QtN
ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρ˜
1−ω
X,t α
∗
2C
∗
t −
wtfX,t
Zt
(76)
d˜∗X,t =
1
σ
1
Qt
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
X,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
X,t α2Ct −
w∗t f
∗
X,t
Z∗t
(77)
ρFDI,t = N
∗−ψ
I,t ρ˜
∗
I,t (64)
ρ∗FDI,t = N
−ψ
I,t ρ˜I,t (65)
• Firm level pricing - Domestically sold goods:
ρ˜D,t =
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜D,t
(66)
ρ˜∗D,t =
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜∗D,t
(67)
• Firm level pricing - Exported goods:
ρ˜X,t =
τt
Qt
σ
σ − 1
wt
Ztz˜X,t
(68)
ρ˜∗X,t = τ
∗
t Qt
σ
σ − 1
w∗t
Z∗t z˜∗X,t
(69)
• Price indices - FDI Components:
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d˜I,t = Qt
[
1
σ
N
ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρ˜
1−ω
I,t (1− α1 − α2)C∗t −
w∗t f
∗
I,t
Z∗t
]
(78)
d˜∗I,t =
1
Qt
[
1
σ
N
∗ψ(ω−1)−1
I,t ρ˜
∗1−ω
I,t (1− α1 − α2)Ct −
wtfI,t
Zt
]
(79)
NX,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜−kX,t − z˜−kI,t ) (86)
N∗X,t
N∗D,t
= (zmin)
∗k(z˜∗−kX,t − z˜∗−kI,t ) (87)
• Share of FDI firms:
NI,t
ND,t
= (zmin)
k(z˜I,t)
−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
(88)
N∗I,t
N∗D,t
= (zmin)
∗k(z˜I,t)∗−k
(
k
k − (σ − 1)
) k
σ−1
, (89)
• Free-entry conditions:
v˜st = wt
fE,t
ZE,t
(80)
v˜s∗t = w
∗
t
f ∗E,t
Z∗E,t
(81)
• Optimal labor supply:
χL
1
ψ
t = wtC
−γ
t (82)
χL
∗ 1
ψ
t = w
∗
tC
∗−γ
t (83)
• Labor market clearing:
Lt =
(σ − 1)
wt
[
ND,td˜D,t +NX,td˜X,t +N
∗
I,tQtd˜
∗
I,t
]
+
σ
Zt
[
NE,tfE,t
σ
+NX,tfX,t +N
∗
I,tfI,t
]
(84)
L∗t =
(σ − 1)
w∗t
[
N∗D,td˜
∗
D,t +N
∗
X,td˜
∗
X,t +NI,tQ
−1
t d˜I,t
]
+
σ
Z∗t
[
N∗E,tf
∗
E,t
σ
+N∗X,tf
∗
X,t +NI,tf
∗
I,t
]
(85)
• Share of exporters:
• Average profits from FDI goods produced by foreign affiliate:
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• Terms of Labor:
TOLt =
(
wt
ZtQt
)−1(
w∗t
Z∗t
)
(96)
rbf,t =
vb∗t + d
b∗
t
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(100)
• Zero-profit export cutoff:
d˜X,t =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
τ1−ωt
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
fX,t
α∗2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
ω
(
f∗I,t
1−α∗1−α∗2
)
τ1−ωt
(
NX,t
NI,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
ω−1
σ−1
α∗2 − fX,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
wt
Zt
(90)
d˜∗X,t =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
f∗X,t
α2
) k−σ+1
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
−ω
τ1−ωt
(
fI,t
1−α1−α2
)(
N∗X,t
N∗I,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k−σ+11−ω
(
f∗X,t
α2
) k
1−ω −
[
(TOLt)
−ω
(
fI,t
1−α1−α2
)
τ1−ωt
(
N∗X,t
N∗I,t
)(ψ(ω−1)−1)] k1−ω
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
ω−1
σ−1
α2 − f∗X,t
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
w∗t
Zt
∗
(91)
• Zero-profit FDI cutoff:
d˜I,t = Qt
(
 1−ω1−σ − 1
) w∗t
Z∗t
f ∗I,t (92)
d˜∗I,t =
1
Qt
(
 1−ω1−σ − 1
) wt
Zt
fI,t (93)
N∗D,t+1 = (1− δ)(N∗D,t +N∗E,t) (95)
• Law of motion of domestic firms:
ND,t+1 = (1− δ)(ND,t +NE,t) (94)
• Definitions of returns:
rsh,t = (1− δ)
v˜st + d˜t
v˜st−1
(97)
rsf,t = (1− δ)
v˜s∗t + d˜
∗
t
v˜s∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(98)
rbh,t =
vbt + d
b
t
vbt−1
(99)
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• Euler Home and Foreign:
C−γ−νt Et
[
C−γt+1
]
= C∗−γ−νt Et
[
∗C−γt+1
Qt
Qt+1
]
(101)
• Euler Home and Foreign:
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrsh,t+1} (102)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrsf,t+1} (103)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrbh,t+1} (104)
1 = β¯Cγ−νt Et{(Ct+1)−γrbf,t+1} (105)
• Expected Excess Returns:
rshx,t = r
s
h,t − rbh,t (106)
rsfx,t = r
s
f,t − rbh,t (107)
rbfx,t = r
b
f,t − rbh,t (108)
• Definitions of income:
Yt = wtLt +ND,td˜t −NE,tv˜st (109)
Y ∗t = w
∗
tL
∗
t +N
∗
D,td˜
∗
t −N∗E,tv˜s∗t (110)
• Net exports:
NXt =
1
2
[(Yt −QtY ∗t )− (Ct −QtC∗t )] (111)
• Net foreign assets:
NFAt+1 = NXt +NFAtr
b
h,t + af,t−1r
s
fx,t − a∗sh,t−1rshx,t + abf,t−1rbfx,t (112)
For the case of welfare indexed bonds bond dividends are dbt = d
∗b
t = 1, the bond returns
become:
rbh,t =
vbt + 1
vbt−1
(113)
rbf,t =
vb∗t + 1
vb∗t−1
Qt
Qt−1
(114)
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